Redistributive policy and redistribution preferences: The effects of Moscow redevelopment program*

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Abstract

We study a unique dataset of 1400 Moscow residents in order to estimate the effect of participating in a government-sponsored redevelopment program on preferences for redistributive social policy. We find that there is a positive effect: Individuals in buildings slated for redevelopment are more likely to agree that government should reduce income differences between rich and poor, provide for unemployed, and provide housing to everyone who needs it. We believe that the primary channel is through increased trust in the govenrment. Our results suggest yet another pathway the copersistence of redistribution preferences and redistributive state policies.

1 Introduction

Public support for redistributive government policies is central in determining the economic and political outcomes of countries, and is associated with higher taxes and more social spending. Understanding how these preferences are shaped has been the goal of an intense academic effort over the past decades. It is of particular interest to investigate the mechanisms that lead to a persistent heterogeneity among countries, with the support of redistributive economic policies being positively correlated with social spending (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004). Crucial to understanding such mechanisms are micro-level preferences among the populace and the business community for social policy programs, which shape the range of acceptable alternatives from which policymakers can select particular welfare state configurations and the amount of redistribution in an economy (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001).

One understudied aspect of popular support for redistribution stems from citizens' exposure to social policy programs. Positive experiences may lead citizens to support greater and further redistribution, as well as other aspects of the welfare state, while negative experiences may sour them on such interventions. Although a prior

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literature examined this question indirectly by looking at the legacy effects of living under Communist regimes, these works were unable to separate Communnist ideology and education from concrete experiences with the redistributive Communist state (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). In this paper we hone in on a concrete experience with a particular policy program to investigate whether the exposure to a redistributive state policy can cause an individual to be more supportive of redistributive policies in the future, potentially including government initiatives in other general areas of social policy. We then explore the mechanisms by which experiences with policy can lead individuals to support (or not) social policy provision more broadly. In doing so, we draw on a wide range of work that shows that politicians can generate support through the use of clientalistic and materialistic transfers (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Magaloni, 2006; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012), demonstrations of policy competence or responsiveness to the concerns of the populace (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011; Chen, Pan and Yinqing, 2016; Truex, 2016, 2017; Smyth, 2019*b*,*a*), and through influencing voters' perceptions of corruption or the degree of discretion in programs (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). While these papers have primarily focused on how politicians make use of public policy to generate support for themselves and reproduce power, we instead explore whether these mechanisms potentially enable politicians to generate support for future policies in related fields. Although entwined, voters may support politicians in the street or on the ballot box without necessarily ascribing to their policy plans and vice-versa.

In order to explore support for redistribution and social policy due to program inclusion, we exploit a program mean to redevelop mass-produced apartment buildings in Moscow, Russia, which started in 2017. The program's goal is to demolish a large number of highly standardized 5-story apartment buildings constructed in 1950-60s and relocate their residents to newly constructed buildings. This program was fundamentally redistributive, because participation in the program entailed a substantial transfer of wealth from the state because of the higher value of replacement property. Our data derives from an original survey of 1400 Moscow residents from 5-story buildings. Our research design exploits the fact that initial inclusion into the program was exogenous from the standpoint of individual participants. While the authorities selected 5-story programs for initial inclusion along a number of criteria, they lacked building level data with which to do so. Our identification strategy relies on matching a set of buildings that were initially included in the program to a nearby set that were not. The geographic proximity of buildings should ensure balance on a number of objective features of the buildings (property values, infrastructure, local governance, etc.). Moreover, because the government lacked individual level data on key unobservable characteristics – propensity towards collective action, socio-economic status, political attitudes, etc. – and had to rely on neighborhood level data, the choice of buildings within neighborhoods could be considered more or less at random.

Our analysis shows that the program had a significant effect on preferences for redistribution. In particular, residents of the buildings initially targeted by the redevelopment program were more likely to agree with the statements that the government should reduce income differences between rich and poor, provide for the unemployed, and provide housing for everyone who needs it. Our findings also suggest that the primary transmission mechanism is through increased trust in the government. Residents of targeted buildings have more trust in the incumbent political institutions, believe that these institutions defend their interests, and are

less likely to hold officials to be corrupt. That greater trust in the government can lead to lower redistribution preferences has been previously shown in Kuziemko et al. (2015), where subjects who were primed to think negatively about politicians showed less support for a range of state redistribution policies. We, instead, show that trust in the government can be caused by a credible promise of a redistributive social policy, and, in turn, lead individuals to support such policies in the future.

Our work contributes to the growing literature explaining redistribution preferences.[1] Previous research suggests that redistribution preferences can become self-replicating, as beliefs that effort pays off are affected by taxation, and lead to more taxation (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*b*; Benabou and Tirole, 2006); the persistence of both social policy preferences and redistribution can be reinforced by the adoption of political institutions that make the election of pro-redistribution politicians more or less likely (Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009). We suggest than another pathway for this persistence is possible — redistributive policies increase trust in the government and make the public more willing to support such policies in the future. Our work also builds on a burgeoning litertaure on accountability and government support, particularly in non-democratic settings. Whereas existing work focuses attention on how demonstrations of responsiveness build support for politicians themselves, we add to this literature by showing that it also increases support for a stronger government role in particular policy areas.

We also show that the effects of the redevelopment program on the redistribution preferences are manifested in individuals of all age groups. Some of the previous studies looking at the effects of adverse economic experiences on redistribution preferences support the "impressionable years hypothesis", stating that events experienced in the young adult age are especially important to the formation of core values and preferences (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). For example, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) found that economic recessions have an effect only if experienced between 18 and 25 years of age. Similar age-specific responses to recessions and economic inequality are reported by Roth and Wohlfart (2018) and Carreri and Teso (2018) — although in the latter case, macroeconomic shocks were found to have opposite effects on the preferences of high and low social classes. We find that the effect of exposure to redistribution was present in people over 25 as well, while for 18-25 old, it was largely insignificant. However, in our case preferences are shaped by a different and more immediate experience, and a positive one, as opposed to the trauma of a recession.

Our findings help explain high level of pro-redistribution attitudes observed among those who lived in Communist societies, especially the older people. This effect can be potentially attributed to both Communist-era indoctrination and a history of reliance on government-provided benefits (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Our results support the second explanation: exposure to a redistributive social policy makes one more likely

[1] Other sources of redistribution preferences have been implicated: individual income (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981); cultural transmission (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011); Communist legacy (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017); traumatic personal experiences (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Roland and Yang, 2017); beliefs about the level of inequality (Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018), about hard work paying off (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*b*), about one's income relative to others (Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017), and about vertical mobility (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018); fraction of foreign-born population (Rueda, 2018); political institutions (Iversen and Soskice, 2009); and experiences with inequality and recessions (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018).

to support such policies in the future. A similar argument proposed by Chen, Wang and Yang (2016): in a survey experiment in China, those who were reminded about the country's past revolutionary redistributive policies, and did not own substantial property, supported more redistribution. However, in our case redistributive preferences are not driven by historic memory, but by the personal experience of a redistributive policy.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the literature review and outlines the possible hypotheses with respect to the effect of the redevelopment program on redistribution preferences. Section 3 gives the historical background of the Moscow redevelopment program. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 gives the results, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Theory and Hypotheses

Existing work on preferences for redistribution generally, and most forms of social policy in particular, tend to focus heavily on individuals' expectations about how their personal economic circumstances position them to benefit or lose. Classic models of support for redistribution focused primarily on short term considerations, arguing that present income is linked to preferences due to expectations about the net gains of redistribution after taxes. In these models, high income individuals oppose redistribution, because they are likely to be higher in the income redistribution and net back less from such systems than they pay in (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Later extensions of the model introduced individuals' expectations about future gains and losses. For example, Benabou and Ok (2001) argues that individuals' preferences also depend on their expectations about their future position on the income distribution. Another influential class of models instead focuses on negative income shocks, which lead individuals concerned about negative income shocks to seek redistribution as a form of insurance (Moene and Wallerstein, 2014; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012). Of particular importance in contemporary debates is the nature of risk individuals face, whether these are linked to their skill profiles and likelihood of finding similar paying jobs if fired (Iversen and Soskice, 2001), occupational unemployment (Rehm, 2009), or general job insecurity (Carnes and Mares, 2015). Recent work has also noted the importance of accurate information about individuals' material condition – whether income or risk profile – for their preferences. Where individuals are provided with information suggesting that they have overestimated their position on the income ladder, for example, their support for anti-poverty programs (a form of redistribution) increases substantially (Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013).

Drawing together the discussion above, a common thread in both income and risk-based explanations is that participation in programs should only shape preferences for redistribution in so far as they either directly shape individuals' characteristics (e.g. place in the income distribution, risk profile, etc.) or provide more accurate information about them that causes individuals to update their beliefs about the gains from social policy. In the first case, the mechanism by which program participation shapes preferences is a direct one: it improves the participants material well-being. In doing so, it creates expectations that future programs will also likely improve their material well-being, thus leading to support.[2]

[2]This support can obviously be attenuated it the effect of the program is to push the participant so far up the income redistribution or to reduce risks to such a degree that redistribution is no longer a net benefit.

In the second case, the program itself matters less than the informational content it conveys. Here, program participation can be approximated by a Bayesian updating model, which shapes preferences for redistribution indirectly via its effects on individuals beliefs about their material well-being. From this perspective, individuals' beliefs about their material condition consist of a weighted average of their prior beliefs – constructed from past experiences and social interactions – and new information that they gather in the course of their daily lives. Participation in a program provides individuals with additional information about their material well-being by identifying them with a group of similarly positioned (i.e. eligible) individuals and articulating a need they need fulfilled (i.e. the goal of the program). Put another way, individuals are told that they belong to a group that requires government assistance, both identifying a need they might not have recognized, establishing the magnitude of that need, and providing them with a reference category of similarly positioned individuals. The effects of the new information depend crucially on how it alters individuals' priors, however. Such information may cause individuals to realize that their material situation is significantly worse than expected, leading them to be more supportive of redistribution in the future. It may also lead them to realize that their material condition is not quite as bad as they believed, which may dampen support for redistribution. This suggests the following potential channels by which hypothesis:

H_1: Individuals who participate in government programs will support (oppose) redistribution if the program negatively (positively) changes their perceptions of their relative material well-being.

It is worth noting that the individual-level explanations noted above do not take into account individuals' expectations with respect to the government and policy implementation, however. For the most part, redistribution that is promised by the state *de jure* is assumed to be delivered *de facto* precisely as expected, minus dead-weight costs associated with tax disincentive effects on work or administrative costs (Becker, 1985, 1983). Recent contributions in the literature on welfare state outcomes challenges these assumptions by introducing uncertainty in the ability of the government to provide social policy as promised related to demographic pressures (e.g. aging and life expectancy increases), globalization, and the fiscal solvency of the welfare state (Kato, 2003; Pierson, 2001; Myles and Pierson, 2001; Iversen, 2005). More micro-level work has also begun to examine conditions under which trust in government generally (Kuziemko et al., 2015) and institutional quality – particularly corruption and tax evasion – more specifically create credible commitment problems for the state that cause individuals to doubt whether the government will properly and fully provide social policy benefits (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*a*; Mares, 2005; Berens, 2015; Algan, Cahuc and Sangnier, 2016; Marques II, N.d.). Thus, individuals' expectations about their gains and losses from redistribution generally, and concrete social policies designed to achieve this, are tempered by the extent to which they believe the government will actually faithfully implement such policies.

From this perspective, the effect of program participation on preferences again operates through a Bayesian updating mechanism, albeit one in which program participation provides individuals with updated information on the government itself and how it implements social policy. There are a number of different channels through which this could operate, however. The simplest channel, suggested by the literature on government trust and support for social policies, is that program implementation may change participants' perceptions about

the general trustworthiness of the government and its responsiveness to the needs of participants. Successful program implementation should increase trust in the government and its ability to efficaciously implement policy, which should then lead to increased support for redistribution (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Work on government responsiveness and support for incumbent politicians also suggests that programs which enable politicians to demonstrate that they are responsive to the needs of participants can also lead to increased trust (and support) (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011; Chen, Pan and Yinqing, 2016; Truex, 2016, 2017). Even the performance of responsiveness, even if substantively empty, can generate such effects and constitutes a key strategy in non-democratic regimes (Smyth, 2019*a*). Taken together, this suggests:

H_2: Individuals who participate in government programs will support (oppose) redistribution if the programs strengthens (weakens) their belief in the trustworthiness of government actors.

A third potential channel in this vein involves updated beliefs about the true goals of the program, particularly where these updates suggest that officials are prioritizing their own benefit over the redistributive goals of a program. The classic case is one of corruption, where officials may be manipulating program implementation in order to directly enrich themselves or to provide political allies with the opportunity to make money from any procurement or service contracts tied to the program.[3] Such corruption redirects funds away from the social goals of programs, representing a dead-weight cost that should decrease support for social policy (Mares, 2005). Thus, one would expect support for redistribution to decrease if the process of participating in programs causes individuals to update their prior beliefs about the degree of corruption in government social policy programs. Conversely, where participation in programs leads individuals to believe that corruption in social policy programs is less than they anticipated, they should support redistribution more. We therefore posit:

H_3: Individuals who participate in government programs will support (oppose) redistribution if the program weakens (strengthens belief that government social policy is used for corrupt purposes.

A final channel in this vein involves beliefs about how benefits are assigned and the degree to which social policy benefits are actually assigned to those who deserve them. A large literature on social policy preferences highlights the extent to which beliefs about who deserves social policy preferences shapes support for redistribution. Specifically, these models argue that where individuals believe that economic success is a function of hard work and individual effort, the poor are viewed as less deserving of social policy (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*b*; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Conversely, where economic success stems in large part from accidents of birth, political connections, corruption, or outright luck, individuals are more likely to favor redistribution as an aid to the unfortunate. In these models, beliefs about unfairness in the economy strengthen support for social policy, because these programs are viewed as a way of compensating the unlucky and unfortunate for economic outcomes they have no control over. This insight has important implications for how participation in social policy programs may shape support for social policy. Where participation forces

[3]Although not explicitly tied to service delivery in social policy programs, there is a large literature indicating that firms with political connections have preferential access to government loans and contracts (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006; Gehlbach, 2005; Frye and Iwasaki, 2011; Szakonyi, 2018; Mironov and Zhuravskaya, 2016). With respect to social policy, specifically, Marques II (N.d.) documents the widespread belief in the Russian media that funds assigned to a government-run pension investment fund were being used as a cheap source of capital for state-owned and politically connected firms.

individuals to update their beliefs that social policy programs do indeed go to the legally deserving and are distributed according to firmly established legal criteria, we would expect individuals to support social policy more generally. Conversely, if experiences with social policy programs cause individuals to come to believe that social policy benefits themselves are given out according to arbitrary, discretionary criteria, we would expect their confidence in the ability of such programs to address inequality and unfairness in the economy to be shaken. Consequently, support for redistributive social policy should decline. This suggests:

H_4: Individuals who participate in government programs will support (oppose) redistribution if the program strengthens (weakens) belief that government social policy is granted according to discretionary criteria and not according to the law.

3 Historical background

Moscow's population has grown rapidly in the 20th century, increasing from 1.04 million in 1897 to 5.3 million in 1959. By the post-WWII period, the shortage of residential space was acute, with most of the residents living in barracks and overcrowded communal apartments where several families shared basic facilities such as kitchen and bathroom. In 1950s, the Soviet leadership introduced mass-produced residential housing, and almost 24 million square meters of dwelling was built between 1956 and 1964, mostly in what was then rural area immediately surrounding the city (Colton, 1998). Most of the new construction were 5-story residential buildings, constructed to highly standardized designs from prefabricated concrete. These buildings, colloquially known as *khruschevki* (Khruschov's buildings) shared small kitchens, 1-3 rooms, and a single bathroom, with no elevator or garbage chute provided; most of the buildings had between 3 and 5 20-flat sections. Although there was minor variation in floor plans between and within series, the size of the rooms was very similar across most of the designs (see Table 1).

The construction of the *khruschevki* peaked in 1967, and was quickly supplanted by 9, 12, and 17-story designs that offered better living conditions — particularly, elevators, garbage chutes, more living space, and larger kitchens (Colton, 1998). The *khruschevki* buildings were less prestigious than later constructions, and were sometimes derisively called *khruscheby* — "Khruschev's slums".

As early as 1990s, the Moscow government sought to replace the *khruschevki* with newer buildings; in 1995-1998, some 523 thousands square meters of old residential buildings were demolished (*Moscow City Government*, 1999, 1998). A large-scale redevelopment program was initiated in 1999. It called for the demolition of some 1722 buildings, or approximately 20% of the total stock of 5-story buildings constructed in 1950s-1960s. The residents were relocated to new buildings, generally constructed in neighboring areas. The developers were obliged by the city government to provide replacement apartments for all relocating residents; however, the new buildings were significantly larger, and the surplus apartments could be sold for profit. This program focused on redeveloping earlier, lower-quality models, and was largely completed by 2017 (Pertsova, 2017).

In January 2017, the city government announced new plans to redevelop the *khruschevki*. The new program differed from the previous one in two key respects. First, its scale was to be significantly larger — the initial proposal called for all of the remaining *khruschevki* in the city were to be replaced, including the relatively

high-quality buildings of I-510, I-511, and I-515 series that were excluded from the previous program.[4] The second difference was the procedure according to which the residents of each building were to decide whether or not to participate in the program. Previously, the consent of every single resident of a multi-apartment building has to be secured in order for the building to be demolished, although the city government sometimes took legal action against those who refused to move (Pushkarskaya, 2019). Under the new rules, the consent of only two thirds of the residents would be required in order for a building to be considered for demolition; this was made possible by a new federal law that guaranteed this program a special status.

In early May 2017, the Moscow government published a provisional list of 4546 houses where a vote on the program would be held. Before June 14, owners of apartments in each of those buildings were to vote on whether to join or opt out; the votes could be cast online, or in the local municipal building. If at least two thirds of the votes were in favor, the building was considered to be included in the program. The actual relocation would take place once the replacement building or buildings are available, which for most cases would not happen until several years.

The proposed project, perhaps one of the largest urban renewal efforts ever, generated a considerable amount of opposition. The criticism of the project focused on the fears that the redeveloped districts would be too densely populated and lack the community feel of the old, low-density districts (*The Guardian*, 2017*b*), have poor transport access, and that the City Hall will not honor its promise to relocate residents within the same districts (Evans, 2018).[5] Over 20 thousand attended a rally on May 14, 2017 (*The Guardian*, 2017*a*), protesting against redevelopment plans and the encroachment of *eminent domain* on property rights; smaller rallies were held on other occasions.

At the same time, the majority of residents voted in support of the renovation program. When the voting ended, 4079 buildings voted in favor, with the rest opting out or not meeting the turnout quota of 50%; the median vote in favor of the renovation was as high as 90%. According to a survey carried our by the Levada Center among the residents of the 4546 buildings that were on the May 2017 list, 85% supported the program; 70% of them did so because they expected to move to a higher quality housing, while 54% cited the lack of garbage chute and elevator as a reason for their support, and 46% expected to receive a larger apartment. According to the polling firm, the program's supporters tended to trust the government to improve their living conditions (RBK, 2017).[6] These expectations were partly caused by the repeated promises of the city officials that the renovation program will improve living conditions; in particular, Moscow mayor Sergei Sobianin took aggressively promoting the program.

In June-July 2017, another thousand of buildings joined the program via holding a vote on the homeowners meetings.[7] The final list of buildings in the program, published on August 1, 2017, has some 5110 buildings

[4]The buildings that were redeveloped prior to 2017 had similar floor plans, but were generally constructed from lower-quality materials and had thinner walls.

[5]Some of these fears appear to be justified, as the promise to limit new construction to 14 floors is not honored (*Kommersant*, 2019).

[6]According to an earlier poll, as much as 86% of Russians believe that the government is responsible for providing them with adequate housing (Borisova, Polishchuk and Peresetsky, 2014).

[7]A homeowners meeting is an assembly of owners of property in an apartment building. It has the authority do decide on a broad range of matters, such as choosing a company that manages the building.

slated for renovation (mos.ru, 2017). Most of the actual demolition of the *khruschevki* is expected to take place over the 2020s and beyond, with only 59 buildings to be replaced in 2017-2019, and 264 more in 2020-2021.

4 Empirical strategy

In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey of 1,522 residents of 5-story buildings in the city of Moscow.[8] Our research design is premised on the fact, noted in the previous section, that the government initially assigned buildings to participation without consultation with residents. The government, for its part, did not select buildings at random. Some of its criteria for inclusion were purely objective, such as exclusion of non-standard buildings and those made of brick that were generally in better shape[9]. In a series of interviews with local officials and opposition activists, we learned that the government was also sensitive to the possibility of social unrest and to the value of underlying land to developers. Consequently, it attempted to select buildings on desirable land and whose residents would be unlikely to engage in collective action or lobbying against the program. Crucially for our purposes, however, we also learned that the authorities did not have access to building level data on a number of criteria — support for authorities, propensity for collective action, social capital, etc. —- that factored into their decisions. Empirically, the political data available to authorities was mostly at the electoral district level (a Moscow electoral district has some 2000-2500 eligible voters, which corresponds to approximately 10 four-section *khruschevki*). In Appendix A, we illustrate the validity of some of these intuitions, by showing the results of some tests of the determinants of buildings' inclusion in the program (at two points in time) using data from the full sample of all Moscow 5-story buildings. For the most part, these tests suggest that it is mostly factors correlated with district level voting behavior, building design, and income (in the form of car ownership) that determine inclusion. Taken together, it is clear that the authorities wanted to select buildings according to a non-random criteria and particularly those related to political leanings or protest potential, but they were unable to micro-target individual buildings along these variables.

Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that the program was exogenous with respect to building residents, while the non-random decisions by the government on including individual buildings were largely driven by more aggregated data. Specifically, we exploit the fact that in many electoral districts, some buildings are included in the program at the same time that nearby, otherwise similar buildings are excluded. We argue that within such districts, buildings that are physically proximate to each other were effectively chosen exogenously of political preferences of the residents. Our argument rests on the premise that once one accounts for differences in property values related to the observable characteristics of buildings themselves (primarily construction materials), unobservable characteristics – access to infrastructure, facilities, and local amenities, the quality of

[8]We conducted a parallel survey of 600 randomly selected residents of Moscow at the same time and using a substantially similar survey instrument. We intend to use this to perform a series of robustness checks in later versions of the paper. Intuitively, if the treatment effect we observe is robust, we should observe significant differences between the sample of general Moscovites and our treatment group. This design also allows us to assess the possibility of local spillover and observational effects, which may be biasing our results downward.

[9]In an interview, Sergei Sobianin revealed that buildings in better condition received a lower priority for the renovation program (Raibman, 2017).

government services, utilities, etc. – should be more or less similar. Moreover, we also argue that such buildings should be similar along a number of other unobservables: propensity towards collective action, socio-economic status, political attitudes, etc. If these assumptions are true (and hold once we conduct balance tests between our groups), the main comparison between physically proximate, included and excluded buildings should provide an unbiased estimate of how inclusion in the program shapes our outcomes of interest.

Our sampling methodology is described in detail in Appendix B, below. Briefly, our sampling frame consisted of all 5-story apartments in Moscow that met the criteria for selection into the program (i.e. built between 1955 and 1980), excluding buildings with non-standard blueprints.[10] We then stratified our sample by building material (brick versus panel) to account for intrinsic differences in property value based on the construction materials that went into buildings. We then created a first stage sample by selecting pairs of buildings from each of our strata such that they were located in the same electoral district, each pair had a building included in the May 2017 list that voted and a building excluded from the program that never voted at all, and the buildings in the pair were no more than 500 meters apart. As this procedure was unlikely to allow us to fill out our sample target of 1400 respondents, we supplemented it by selecting physically proximate buildings within the same district and across electoral district lines that were no more than 500 meters apart and where electoral outcomes (one of the primary considerations for the city authorities) were relatively similar. The interviews themselves were conducted either in the entrance way of the buildings or in the public space nearby. Respondents were screened to determine if they were residents of the target building and the interview stopped if they were not.

Table 2 presents the results of balance tests designed to see if the buildings we included in our treatment group are indeed similar to those in the control group along various observable variables that can be correlated with redistribution preferences. The two groups of buildings in our survey differ only on one characteristic — the May 2017 buildings were in slightly worse overall condition ($p = 0.0922$, two-sided t test, $N = 104$). All other values were balanced, including those related to the income of residents, which is the most important correlate of redistribution preferences. In particular, the percentages of car owners and the percentages of people working in health, education, and several other professions, were equal. The share of buildings managed by state-owned *GBU Zhilishnik* companies are similar; this is important because alternative forms of managing the building, such as switching to a private management company or forming a cooperative, requires significant coordination on behalf of residents (Borisova, Polishchuk and Peresetsky, 2014), and may be indicative of different preferences. Another possible indicator of the residents willingness to cooperate with one another is whether the land plot under and around the building has been demarcated and privatized (something which also requires collective

[9]The precise terminology here is subject to debate. Some might call this a natural experiment, due to the near-random nature of assignment or our ability to argue it was random (see Dunning, 2012; Cook, Campbell and Shadish, 2002). Others insist that only cases in which assignment was designed to be truly random qualify (Gerber and Green, 2012, p. 15). We choose to take a more conservative route here and refer to this as a quasi-experiment. Although we use some of the tools of experimental research to analyze our results, we also fall back on causal inference techniques for more traditional observational data in order to check the robustness of our results.

[10]This exclusion is largely due to the fact that such buildings are typically considered higher quality and generally had larger apartments. As a consequence, they generally have higher value than apartments built using standard plans are introduce more unobservables related to property values into any comparison.

action on behalf of the residents); in both parts of our sample, the type of land ownership is similar. The two groups of buildings also did not differ with respect to the real estate prices prior to the renovation program[11], and distance to the nearest metro station.

Next, in Table 3 we compare the individuals surveyed in the two groups of buildings along the characteristics that may be correlated with the preferences for redistribution and/or the attitudes toward the redevelopment program. In particular, the individuals that were surveyed in two groups of buildings had similar demographics (gender, age, education, and income) and same fraction of retirees and state employees. The latter two groups may be particularly vulnerable to state pressure; hence, we do not find evidence that the buildings (at least the buildings in our sample) were selected into the May 2017 list based on the ease of coercing their residents into approving the renovation program. The same fraction of people lived in apartments that they (or their parents/grandparents) received during the Soviet era and privatized in the post-Soviet period. Respondents in both parts of the sample also had similar number of bedrooms in the apartment and number of people per bedroom living in the apartment. Perhaps more importantly, the amount of investment that the residents made into improving their apartments also did not seem to vary, as the same fraction of people in both samples lived in apartments with wooden window frames.[12] These results provide some support for the validity of our identification assumption.

Our primary dependent variables of interest were a series of questions in which respondents were first reminded that while some believe the government has many obligations to citizens, others believe its resources are limited. Respondents were then asked to what extent they believed that the government is obligated to aid the sick (via healthcare services), insure an adequate quality of life for the elderly, insure an adequate quality of life for the unemployed, provide adequate housing to citizens who need it, and provide quality education for children. Finally, the respondents were asked about the degree to which they believed that the government must decrease the gap between the incomes of the rich and poor. This variable nicely captures our primary concept of interest: support for redistribution, while the previous five questions provide additional tests of our theory and opportunities to understand the scope of any effects of participation in housing programs on specific social policies.

Our main specification is an ordinary-least squares linear regression model with electoral district-level fixed effects that takes the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta D_i + \gamma X_i + \rho_d + \epsilon_i. \tag{1}$$

Here, Y_i is our dependent variable of interest, D_i is a dummy variable equal to one for our "treated" observations (i.e. those in the May 2017 list), X_i is a vector of individual controls described below, ρ_d is a set of electoral district fixed effects, and ϵ_i is the error term. It is important to note that the coefficient for D_i here measures the intent-to-treat effect of the treatment, because in some cases, buildings in our control group

[11] We had data on all apartments offered for sale on cian.ru website in August and December 2016.

[12] In our questionnaire, we included a question about the material from which the window frames in the apartment were made. When the buildings were originally constructed, wooden frames were installed. During the past 20 years, plastic frames were often used to replace the deteriorating originals; installation of new frames is often the first step in making improvements to one's apartment.

held votes on inclusion in the program (e.g. one-sided noncompliance). These were eligible for inclusion in our control group, because buildings that voted against inclusion in the program were never included in any of the lists we used to stratify the sample frame into buildings eligible for inclusion in the treatment and control groups.

Because buildings, not individuals, are assigned treatment, we also include a number of individual level controls that prior work suggests should be associated with support for social policy and that are derived from our survey. These include a dummy variable indicating the respondent is male, the respondent's reported age, a dummy variable for whether the respondent has higher education, an ordinal measure of income based on individuals' self assessment of their purchasing power, the number bedrooms in the apartment, the number of people per bedroom in their apartment, and a vector of dummy variables indicating that the respondent is unemployed, employed by the government, has privatized their apartment, and the apartment has wooden window frames. We also supplement this with data from the reformazhkh.ru database on whether the building is managed (i.e. maintenance provision and trash collection) by the state or private management companies.

Having established that inclusion in the program shapes support for redistribution, generally, and a range of other social policies, we then proceed to explore which channels may be driving the relationship. Each of the hypotheses presented above takes the character of a mediated variable, in which inclusion in the program shapes an attitude – of material well-being (H_1), trust in government officials (H_2), government corruption (H_3), or capriciousness in distributing social policy (H_4) – which in turn shapes support for redistribution and social policies. We would also expect these attitudes to have direct effects in so far as they are correlated with respondents' economic characteristics and place in the income distribution (H_1) (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) and evaluations of the efficacy of governments and their ability to provide de-facto benefits in line with de-jure promises (H_2) (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Mares, 2005; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005*a*; Marques II, N.d.).

In order to examine the relative weight of these effects and evaluate whether any of our hypotheses are indeed the mechanism linking program inclusion to social policy preferences, we need to demonstrate that our treatment D influences one or more of the proposed mediator variables Z, that the mediator variables influence the outcome Y, and that once we control for mediators the magnitude of the effect of treatment on outcome changes. This can be done using a system of three equations: regressing Y on Z and D, regressing Z on D, and regressing Y on D (Baron and Kenny, 1986). All of these should include a battery of controls to rule out alternative explanations and spurious correlations. Once this system is estimated, it is possible to recover three quantities of interest: the total effect of D on Y (through all channels), the indirect (mediation) effect of how changes in D shape Y by altering values of one of our mediators of interest Z, and the direct effect of how D shapes Y independent of Z, and the total effect.[13]

The traditional approach to mediation analysis involves evaluating the system of three equations described above, multiplying the slope co-efficients of the variables of interest, and checking for statistical significance. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that this technique is unsuitable for applications such as ours, where both treatment and several potential mediator variables are binary. We make use of a general algorithm proposed in

[13]Recent applications of this technique include **????**.

Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010); Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010); Imai et al. (2011) and implemented in Stata by Hicks and Tingley (2011), which estimates the three equations from observed values of D, Y, and Z and then computes the quantities of interest by using a quasi-Bayesian procedure to simulate the model parameters and generate point estimates and confidence intervals for them.

In order to operationalize our potential mediator variables, we draw questions directly from our survey. To test H_1, we make use of two survey instruments asking respondents if they believe that program participants will receive more spacious apartments (*more room*) or apartments of greater property value (*more value*) to proxy for perceptions of relative material gain. These variables are binary, since the original survey questions they are based on were binary responses that asked respondents whether they agree with a set of statements.

To test H_2 — whether the mechanism involves increased trust in government — we deploy two measures. The first is *trust in authors* of the program, capturing the extent to which respondents generally trust those whom they hold responsible for initiating and managing the 5-story building renovation program. We construct this variable using a question that provides respondents with a list of government officials (the president, the government, the municipal government, etc.) and asks them to indicate those they believe responsible for authoring the program. We then match these responses to another question which independently asks respondents to rate their level of generalized trust in various groups of government officials. Our measure is the average level of trust for the three groups of officials respondents held responsible for the program. Our second proxy is a measure of the belief that various *incumbents defend* popular interest during the course of the redevelopment program, regardless of whether they were seen as authors or not. From this we generate a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents believe any incumbents were defending the interests of the populace during the program.

To examine H_3 — whether the channel linking the treatment to preferences for social policy has to do with changes in the perception that officials are corrupt — we make use of a binary response variable that asks respondents whether they agree that the program served to enrich public officials and developers (*corrupt intent*).

Finally, to examine H_4 — whether the program shaped support through social policy by shaping beliefs that social policy benefits are not assigned according to law — we make use of two additional proxies. The first *policy discretion* — the average of a three questions (on a four point response scale), which ask respondents whether they believe that pensions, access to government medical services, and housing benefits are all awarded based on written, legal criteria. The second variable we use is *rule of law* — a response to the question (with four response categories) that asks respondents to what extent they believe that government officials can be trusted to follow the law.

5 Results

In Table 4 we begin our analysis by showing how inclusion in the 5-story program shaped individuals attitudes towards redistribution and more general forms of social policy. Inclusion into the program is associated with a higher level of support for redistribution (i.e. closing the gap between the rich and the poor) at the 95%

confidence level. This is in line with our expectations that inclusion in the program increases participants' expectations about the value of redistributive social programs to them. Moving to more specific social policy programs, it is notable that participation in the program is associated with higher levels of support for unemployment and housing insurance at conventional levels of significance, but not with support for healthcare, support for the elderly, or education. This is likely due to the near universal support for the latter types of social policy, however, with more than 85% of respondents supporting healthcare, elderly insurance, and education. Consequently, inclusion in the program may simply have not provided enough new information to shape attitudes towards these programs, particularly if the effect of the program was generally positive.

In Table 5 we repeat the estimation without including fixed effects for the building group; instead, we account for the electoral outcomes at the electoral district level, as well as the building wall material (brick or concrete). As before, the inclusion into the program is associated with higher levels of support for unemployment, housing provision, and general rich-to-poor redistribution.

Having established that inclusion in the program shaped attitudes towards redistribution generally, and housing and unemployment policies more specifically, we now turn to attempting to identify the causal mechanism driving the effect. As we discussed in Section 4, this involves a three-stage process. Tables 6 – 7 illustrate the first stage, in which we examine whether our treatment variable and our proxies for potential causal mechanisms predict support for social policies. In particular, we wish to see if the effect of the treatment variable shifts once we include our proxies for the causal mechanisms presented in Section 2. Table 6 suggests that only our proxies of trust in government — average level of generalized trust for the program's authors and the belief that government institutions defended the respondents' interests during the program — are statistically significant predictors of support for redistribution ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$, respectively). Consistent with the expectations of H_2, increases in these variables are associated with increased support for redistribution. Our other proxies fail to reach significance at conventional levels.

In Table 7 we look at the effects of treatment and potential mediating variables on the beliefs that the government should provide housing. As before, both of our proxies for trust in government were statistically significant $p < 0.01$, and are positive predictors of support for providing housing to all who need it. In addition, however, we also find evidence that other potential channels mattered. Our proxy for beliefs that the program was carried out with corrupt intent of officials to enrich themselves and developers was also statistically significant $p > 0.01$ and decreased support for housing provision. Similarly, our two proxies for beliefs that social policy benefits are assigned transparently and according to legal criteria (belief that officials can be trusted to follow the law and belief that various social policy benefits are awarded according to legal criteria) were also positive and statistically significant predictors of support for government provision of housing. At the same time, we did not find evidence that beliefs that the program would materially benefit participants by providing more valuable or spacious property shaped attitudes towards housing provision, however.

In Table 8 the dependent variable is the belief that the government should provide for the unemployed. Only one of our proxies for trust in government — belief that the program's authors defended respondents' interests — was statistically significant at $p < .05$. Interestingly, there was also mixed evidence in our proxies for material gain (H_1), as the belief the program would provide participants more space was a significant predictor

$p < 0.05$ of support for unemployment benefits. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, however, respondents who believed the program would provide participants with more spacious housing were less supportive of unemployment benefits.

Having showed that nearly all of the possible channels proposed in Section 2 are plausible mechanisms linking program participation to support for redistribution, we next examine whether these channels were themselves shaped by program inclusion. As discussed in Section 4, a variable can only mediate the relationship between a treatment and an outcome if the treatment itself is a statistically significant predictor of it. Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. It suggests that there is some evidence that inclusion in the program made respondents more likely to believe that the renovation program would award participants more valuable $p < 0.01$ or spacious $p < 0.1$ apartments, which is consistent with the hypothesis H_1 that participation in the program changes the perception of relative material well-being. We also found some support for H_2 that shaping participants trust in government is a plausible channel. Although inclusion in the program did little to shape generalized trust in government agencies deemed responsible for the program, it did have a significant and positive effect on the belief that the government defended the interests of program participants $p < 0.01$. Table 9 also suggests that inclusion in the program was associated with a weaker belief that the program was meant to enrich officials and developers (H_3) at $p < 0.01$. By contrast, beliefs that social policy benefits have a discretionary component do not appear to have been influenced by inclusion in the program (H_4).

Finally, in Table 10 we present the results of our mediation analysis for each of the four potential channels and each of our three dependent variables. A brief inspection of the confidence intervals suggests that the mediation effects of the beliefs that program participants can receive apartments that are larger and of greater value are not significant. Hence, our evidence fails to support H_1:

Result 1: The effect of participation in government programs on redistribution preferences is not mediated by changes in the perceptions of relative material well-being.

The mediation effects of the trust in the authors of the program is not significant for any of the three dependent variables. At the same time, our proxy for trust in government has a mediation effect that reaches conventional levels of significance. The mediation effect of this variable on the support for rich/poor redistribution was 0.0115, indicating that participation in the program increased beliefs that incumbents defended the popular interest during the program, which in turn led to greater support for redistribution. The direct effect of program inclusion in this specification was 0.0721. The total effect is 0.084, implying that approximately 13.7% of the effect of program inclusion flowed through its effects on trust in government. The mediation effect on the support for housing provision was also present, and was equal to 0.0228, or 20.3% of total effect. The results are significant at $p < 0.1$ and $p < 0.05$, respectively, which implies that hypothesis H_2 is supported:

Result 2: The effect of participation in government programs on redistribution preferences can be mediated by changes in the trust in government actors.

Participation in the program reduces the beliefs that the renovation program is used to enrich officials and the construction industry. These beliefs, in turn, are associated with lower support for the government

provision of housing and government support for unemployed. The mediation effect for housing provision is equal to 0.0107 and the total effect is 0.1077, which implies that approximately 9.9% of the effect of program inclusion on support for unemployment programs flows through changes in whether the program authors' intent is viewed as corrupt. The corresponding figures for unemployment support are 0.0145, 0.1077, and 13.15%. The results are significant at $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.1$, respectively, which implies that hypothesis H_3 is supported:

Result 3: The effect of participation in government programs on redistribution preferences can be mediated by changes in the beliefs that government social policy is used for corrupt purposes.

Finally, neither the belief that social policy is discretionary and is rule-based, nor the belief that civil servants can be trusted to follow the law, do not have a significant mediating effect. Hence, H_4 is not supported:

Result 4: The effect of participation in government programs on redistribution preferences is not mediated by changes in the beliefs that government social policy is granted according to the law.

6 Conclusion

We use data from a unique survey of 1400 Muscovites to look at the effects of participation in government-sponsored housing program on one's preferences for redistributive economic policies. We find that there is an effect, with program participants more supportive of such policies. Our findings suggest that the primary channel of this effect is through the increased trust in the government of the recipients of government redistributive policies. Thus we find another pathway through which such preferences can become self-replicating and persist over large periods of time.

Our results are not driven by the effect of the program on young adults, as the impressionable years theory would predict. This theory would assume that the effect of the program would be the strongest, or, perhaps, even limited to, individuals between 18 and 25 years of age. The results that we find are the opposite: the effect of the treatment is predicted to be stronger in the people above that age. The coefficient for the interaction term is highly significant ($p = 0.005$, $p = 0.005$, and $p = 0.035$) for the support of the government reducing rich-poor income differences, providing for the unemployed, and providing housing for all who need it. We believe that there may be several reasons why our results might differ from those of Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), Roth and Wohlfart (2018), or Carreri and Teso (2018). First, these works look at negative, prolonged experiences, such as living through a recession, while in our case the experience is positive and localized in time. Second, in our case the experience is more immediate, with only 1.5 years between the voting and the time when the survey took place.

In Table **??** we check the robustness of our results to one-sided non-compliance. As noted above, our empirical strategy was based on comparing buildings that were initially assigned to the program by the government to those that never appeared on government lists of buildings that voted for inclusion in the program. In the course of our research, we discovered that some buildings voted on inclusion and opted out of the program. In these cases, buildings formally voted but were not included in any of the lists. As this is akin to members of the control group receiving treatment, we therefore instrument for whether individuals actually voted using

our treatment variable as an instrumental variable for treatment (Gerber and Green, 2012). This enables us to estimate the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) rather than the Intent-to-treat Effect measured in Table 4. As Table 12 indicates, our results are similar, with statistically significant and positive effects of treatment on support for redistribution $p < 0.05$, unemployment $p < 0.05$, and housing $p < 0.01$.

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Figure 1: An archetypical block of I-510 series apartment buildings. All buildings in this picture appeared on the May 2017 list, and voted in favor of the program.

Series	Walls	Apartment area, m2			Kitchen, m2	Ceiling, cm
		1-room	2-room	3-room		
I-510	Concrete	30.5-32.2	41-45.5	54-55	5.5	2.48-2.7
I-511	Brick	30.1	41.1-43.7	56.7	4.9-5.3	2.48-2.7
I-515	Concrete	30.4-32	40-45.6	54-58.3	5.5	2.48

Source: flatinfo.ru (2019), russianrealty.ru (2019).

Table 1: Characteristics of typical 5-story apartment buildings.

	May 2017 list				
	No	Yes	Test	p	N
Distance to closest metro station	2.174	1.909	Two-tailed t	0.7192	120
State-managed	0.655	0.672	Fisher's exact	0.8505	122
			Chi 2	0.8454	122
Year built	1964.4	1963.6	Two-tailed t	0.3206	122
			Ranksum	0.4475	122
Overall condition, 0-excellent, 100-poor	35.222	38.379	Two-tailed t	0.0922	104
Car owners	0.214	0.212	Two-tailed t	0.8102	109
Retirees	0.251	0.246	Two-tailed t	0.6783	109
Children	0.153	0.156	Two-tailed t	0.7691	109
Work in health care	0.011	0.010	Two-tailed t	0.6971	109
Work in education	0.016	0.015	Two-tailed t	0.7681	109
Work in culture	0.002	0.003	Two-tailed t	0.4497	109
Work in utilities	0.002	0.004	Two-tailed t	0.1146	109
Work in transport	0.006	0.006	Two-tailed t	0.9909	109
Price per m sq, 1000 RuR	156.060	158.144	Two-tailed t	0.7019	53
Total number of buildings	58	64			
Total N of people surveyed	645	672			
Number of brick buildings	34	36			
N of people surveyed in brick buildings	349	364			
Number of panel buildings	24	28			
N of people surveyed in panel buildings	296	308			
Buildings: Unmarked land	46	53	Chi2	0.1137	
Buildings: Municipal land	11	6			
Buildings: Privatized land	1	5			

The table reports test statistics comparing two groups of buildings in our sample: Those that appeared on the May 2017 list, and those that did not. *State-managed* is 1 if the building is managed by the municipally-owned *GBU Zhilishnik* company; *car owners*, *retirees*, *children*, and *work in ...* are the proportions of residents in a building belonging to those categories. *Price per sq meter, 2016* is the average per meter price of apartments that were in this building that were listed on the cian.ru website in December 2016.

Table 2: Comparing buildings on and off May 2017 list.

	May 2017 list				
	No	Yes	Test	p	N
Male	0.44	0.40	Fisher's exact	0.1180	1317
			Chi 2	0.1139	1317
Age	44.14	45.04	Two-tailed t	0.2749	1317
			Ranksum	0.2203	1317
Higher education	0.47	0.50	Fisher's exact	0.2469	1317
			Chi 2	0.2281	1317
Income	0.50	0.49	Two-tailed t	0.7678	1314
			Ranksum	0.8216	1314
Retiree	0.20	0.22	Fisher's exact	0.5421	1317
			Chi 2	0.5255	1317
State employee	0.24	0.25	Fisher's exact	0.7010	1317
			Chi 2	0.6828	1317
Privatized apartment	0.53	0.54	Fisher's exact	0.9559	1317
			Chi 2	0.9328	1317
Number of rooms	2.12	2.09	Two-tailed t	0.3379	1317
			Ranksum	0.2840	1317
Residents per room	1.70	1.69	Two-tailed t	0.7952	1317
Wood window frames	0.37	0.37	Fisher's exact	1.0000	1317
			Chi 2	0.9575	1317
Hour of interview	15.44	15.36	Two-tailed t	0.6393	1317
			Kolmogorov-Smirnov	0.3752	1317

The table compares individuals in two groups of buildings where the survey was carried out. First, these are the buildings included in the May 2017 list. Second, these are the buildings not included in that list. Income is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category ('We do not have enough money even to buy food") and 1 to the highest (). *Retiree* and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, resectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood.

Table 3: Comparing individuals in buildings on and off May 2017 list.

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017	0.0817**	-0.00818	0.00417	0.111**	0.108**	-0.00767
	(0.0391)	(0.0215)	(0.0212)	(0.0477)	(0.0427)	(0.0219)
Male	-0.0207	-0.0482**	-0.0303	0.00199	-0.0607	-0.0295
	(0.0411)	(0.0225)	(0.0222)	(0.0501)	(0.0448)	(0.0230)
Age	0.00433**	0.00235**	0.00228**	-0.000401	-0.000204	-0.000306
	(0.00190)	(0.00104)	(0.00103)	(0.00233)	(0.00208)	(0.00107)
Higher ed	-0.0838**	-0.0401*	-0.0268	-0.120**	-0.153***	-0.0135
	(0.0411)	(0.0226)	(0.0223)	(0.0499)	(0.0449)	(0.0230)
Income	-0.155	0.0638	0.0476	-0.272*	-0.220	0.0184
	(0.128)	(0.0694)	(0.0681)	(0.158)	(0.140)	(0.0704)
Unemployed	-0.0923	0.163*	0.118	0.332*	-0.0169	0.131
	(0.153)	(0.0858)	(0.0846)	(0.192)	(0.169)	(0.0875)
Retiree	-0.0000709	-0.0450	-0.0434	-0.0380	-0.0530	0.0273
	(0.0742)	(0.0406)	(0.0399)	(0.0908)	(0.0811)	(0.0413)
State employee	0.153***	0.0245	0.0608**	0.0495	0.0718	0.0438
	(0.0503)	(0.0274)	(0.0271)	(0.0606)	(0.0545)	(0.0280)
Privatized apt	0.0457	0.00902	0.0409*	-0.00360	0.00114	0.0330
	(0.0426)	(0.0234)	(0.0231)	(0.0519)	(0.0464)	(0.0238)
Number of rooms	-0.0589	-0.0253	-0.0238	-0.0459	0.0491	-0.0132
	(0.0371)	(0.0203)	(0.0201)	(0.0458)	(0.0406)	(0.0208)
People/room	-0.0177	0.00964	-0.0144	-0.0395	0.0793**	0.000142
	(0.0343)	(0.0186)	(0.0184)	(0.0415)	(0.0372)	(0.0191)
Wood frames	-0.00686	-0.0275	0.0127	0.0687	0.0373	-0.0169
	(0.0451)	(0.0248)	(0.0245)	(0.0551)	(0.0493)	(0.0252)
Brick	0.134	-0.108	-0.00849	-0.178	0.0857	0.184
	(0.313)	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.384)	(0.345)	(0.179)
State-managed building	0.161*	0.0675	0.0206	0.189*	0.207**	0.130**
	(0.0938)	(0.0514)	(0.0506)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.0523)
N	1254	1310	1310	1268	1275	1309
r2	0.0923	0.107	0.105	0.120	0.103	0.0901

OLS regressions. Building group fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The effect of the redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies (building group FE).

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.0897**	-0.00551	-0.00450	0.120**	0.127***	-0.00771
	(0.0388)	(0.0216)	(0.0208)	(0.0484)	(0.0426)	(0.0217)
Male	-0.00303	-0.0467**	-0.0346	0.00996	-0.0479	-0.0368
	(0.0403)	(0.0224)	(0.0216)	(0.0502)	(0.0442)	(0.0225)
Age	0.00487***	0.00225**	0.00269***	0.0000718	-0.00112	-0.000177
	(0.00186)	(0.00103)	(0.000998)	(0.00232)	(0.00204)	(0.00104)
Higher education	-0.0683*	-0.0511**	-0.0359*	-0.121**	-0.173***	-0.0267
	(0.0403)	(0.0224)	(0.0216)	(0.0501)	(0.0443)	(0.0225)
Income	-0.124	0.131**	0.122*	-0.304**	-0.241*	0.0363
	(0.121)	(0.0669)	(0.0642)	(0.153)	(0.133)	(0.0668)
Unemployed	-0.0209	0.199**	0.142*	0.317	-0.0625	0.165*
	(0.154)	(0.0872)	(0.0841)	(0.197)	(0.170)	(0.0874)
Retiree	0.0207	-0.0408	-0.0493	-0.0617	-0.0620	0.0302
	(0.0719)	(0.0399)	(0.0384)	(0.0900)	(0.0790)	(0.0399)
State employee	0.176***	0.0271	0.0601**	0.0961	0.0806	0.0401
	(0.0481)	(0.0267)	(0.0258)	(0.0595)	(0.0527)	(0.0269)
Privatized apartment	0.0604	0.0449**	0.0644***	-0.0365	0.0246	0.0548**
	(0.0402)	(0.0223)	(0.0215)	(0.0499)	(0.0440)	(0.0224)
Number of rooms	-0.0721**	-0.0271	-0.0281	0.00850	0.0630	-0.0145
	(0.0357)	(0.0198)	(0.0191)	(0.0450)	(0.0392)	(0.0199)
Residents per room	-0.0195	-0.000306	-0.0267	-0.00861	0.0779**	0.00154
	(0.0326)	(0.0181)	(0.0175)	(0.0408)	(0.0359)	(0.0183)
Wood window frames	-0.0293	-0.00254	0.0379*	0.0129	0.0167	-0.00741
	(0.0418)	(0.0233)	(0.0224)	(0.0521)	(0.0459)	(0.0233)
Brick building	0.0275	0.00402	0.00852	0.0471	0.0252	0.000255
	(0.0402)	(0.0223)	(0.0216)	(0.0500)	(0.0441)	(0.0224)
State-managed building	0.121***	0.0885***	0.0658***	0.0687	0.0521	0.0944***
	(0.0458)	(0.0256)	(0.0247)	(0.0573)	(0.0504)	(0.0256)
2013 mayoral, turnout	-0.318	0.444	-0.223	-1.687**	-1.819**	0.0227
	(0.691)	(0.387)	(0.373)	(0.860)	(0.764)	(0.389)
2013 mayoral, Sobianin's vote share	-0.0431	-0.0943	0.0965	-0.769	0.186	0.122
	(0.413)	(0.230)	(0.222)	(0.516)	(0.458)	(0.231)
2013 mayoral, Navalny's vote share, raion-level	-0.962	-0.0719	0.0308	-1.375	0.547	-0.167
	(0.812)	(0.452)	(0.436)	(1.007)	(0.896)	(0.453)
N	1234	1288	1288	1246	1253	1287
r2	0.0412	0.0306	0.0380	0.0292	0.0415	0.0248

OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies (no building group FE).

	Trust in Authors	Policy Discretion	Rule of Law	More Space	More Value	Incumbents Defend	Corrupt Intent
May 2017 list	0.0674	0.0933**	0.0820**	0.0782**	0.0856**	0.0697*	0.0762*
	(0.0416)	(0.0406)	(0.0399)	(0.0388)	(0.0390)	(0.0391)	(0.0391)
Variable	0.0269	0.0635**	0.0113	0.0255	-0.0633	0.0787*	-0.0290
	(0.0250)	(0.0274)	(0.0227)	(0.0422)	(0.0492)	(0.0423)	(0.0428)
Male	-0.0161	-0.0382	-0.0181	-0.0199	-0.0225	-0.0231	-0.0200
	(0.0438)	(0.0431)	(0.0420)	(0.0411)	(0.0411)	(0.0411)	(0.0411)
Age	0.00460**	0.00237	0.00478**	0.00430**	0.00427**	0.00437**	0.00433**
	(0.00206)	(0.00203)	(0.00194)	(0.00190)	(0.00190)	(0.00190)	(0.00190)
Higher education	-0.0963**	-0.104**	-0.0895**	-0.0827**	-0.0815**	-0.0822**	-0.0804*
	(0.0439)	(0.0428)	(0.0419)	(0.0411)	(0.0411)	(0.0410)	(0.0413)
Income	-0.0811	-0.151	-0.177	-0.160	-0.145	-0.162	-0.158
	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Unemployed	-0.0762	-0.0922	-0.126	-0.0940	-0.0826	-0.0841	-0.0954
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Retiree	-0.0235	-0.00624	-0.0124	-0.00115	0.00250	-0.00856	-0.00165
	(0.0795)	(0.0791)	(0.0764)	(0.0742)	(0.0742)	(0.0742)	(0.0743)
State employee	0.136**	0.133***	0.164***	0.154***	0.155***	0.150***	0.153***
	(0.0534)	(0.0516)	(0.0510)	(0.0503)	(0.0502)	(0.0502)	(0.0503)
Privatized apartment	0.0576	0.0499	0.0599	0.0445	0.0449	0.0466	0.0462
	(0.0458)	(0.0445)	(0.0437)	(0.0427)	(0.0426)	(0.0426)	(0.0426)
Number of rooms	-0.0591	-0.0570	-0.0675*	-0.0596	-0.0592	-0.0595	-0.0584
	(0.0393)	(0.0392)	(0.0382)	(0.0371)	(0.0371)	(0.0371)	(0.0371)
Residents per room	-0.0287	-0.0242	-0.0270	-0.0191	-0.0172	-0.0177	-0.0184
	(0.0368)	(0.0364)	(0.0352)	(0.0343)	(0.0343)	(0.0342)	(0.0343)
Wood window frames	-0.0356	-0.0241	-0.00453	-0.00904	-0.00609	-0.00454	-0.00771
	(0.0486)	(0.0476)	(0.0466)	(0.0452)	(0.0451)	(0.0451)	(0.0451)
State-managed building	0.160	0.117	0.155	0.157*	0.163*	0.153	0.158*
	(0.102)	(0.0971)	(0.0976)	(0.0941)	(0.0938)	(0.0938)	(0.0939)
N	1098	1102	1186	1254	1254	1254	1254
r2	0.0917	0.101	0.103	0.0924	0.0934	0.0948	0.0925

OLS regressions. Building group fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should reduce income differences between rich and poor>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. Model 1: *Variable* is the average answer to the following 8 questions: <Do you trust [President of Russia, Government of Russia, State Duma, Mayor of Moscow, Moscow State Duma, *Uprava* (or district administration), district council, United Russia party] in representing your rights and interests?> The answers are 3 - <Completely trust>, 2 - <Somewhat trust>, 1 - <Somewhat distrust>, 0 - <Do not trust at all>. We use answers from only those institutions that were mentioned as potential authors of the renovation program in a seperate question asking respondents to name up to three of institutions they felt were authors of the program (from a list of these eight). Model 2: *Variable* is the average of the answers to the following three questions: <Do you agree that [the size of pensions/ housing benefits/ access to medical services] are provided according to transparent criteria? The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 3: *Variable* is the individual's answer to the question: <Do you agree that civil servants can be trusted to follow the law?>. The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 4: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of larger size than the one they currently own>. Model 5: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of greater market value than the one they currently own>. Model 6: *Variable* is whether the individual has marked any of the institutions mentioned in Model 1 when asked which government institutions follow primarily public interest with respect to the renovation program. Model 7: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <The renovation program will enrich city officians and the construction industry>.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: The effects of program participation and various potential mechanisms on support for redistribution

	Trust in Authors	Policy Discretion	Rule of Law	More Space	More Value	Incumbents Defend	Corrupt Intent
May 2017 list	0.0779*	0.0759*	0.107**	0.109**	0.113***	0.0864**	0.0941**
	(0.0450)	(0.0442)	(0.0442)	(0.0424)	(0.0426)	(0.0425)	(0.0427)
Variable	0.0806***	0.0860***	0.0569**	-0.0315	-0.0652	0.162***	-0.101**
	(0.0270)	(0.0298)	(0.0253)	(0.0461)	(0.0536)	(0.0458)	(0.0468)
Male	-0.0454	-0.0701	-0.0555	-0.0617	-0.0624	-0.0677	-0.0586
	(0.0474)	(0.0469)	(0.0464)	(0.0448)	(0.0448)	(0.0446)	(0.0447)
Age	0.00149	0.000473	0.000422	-0.000205	-0.000198	-0.0000512	-0.000152
	(0.00223)	(0.00222)	(0.00216)	(0.00208)	(0.00208)	(0.00207)	(0.00207)
Higher education	-0.136***	-0.160***	-0.147***	-0.154***	-0.152***	-0.151***	-0.142***
	(0.0475)	(0.0466)	(0.0464)	(0.0448)	(0.0448)	(0.0446)	(0.0450)
Income	-0.112	-0.0580	-0.286*	-0.214	-0.209	-0.237*	-0.229
	(0.154)	(0.149)	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Unemployed	-0.0214	0.173	-0.0323	-0.0139	-0.00814	-0.000804	-0.0287
	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.174)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Retiree	-0.0430	-0.0573	-0.0839	-0.0499	-0.0512	-0.0747	-0.0608
	(0.0862)	(0.0862)	(0.0848)	(0.0811)	(0.0810)	(0.0809)	(0.0810)
State employee	0.0797	0.104*	0.0798	0.0728	0.0728	0.0662	0.0670
	(0.0574)	(0.0560)	(0.0561)	(0.0544)	(0.0544)	(0.0542)	(0.0544)
Privatized apartment	-0.0210	-0.0127	0.00765	0.00235	0.0000361	0.00458	0.00249
	(0.0495)	(0.0484)	(0.0484)	(0.0464)	(0.0464)	(0.0462)	(0.0463)
Number of rooms	0.0503	0.0444	0.0522	0.0493	0.0486	0.0467	0.0508
	(0.0427)	(0.0426)	(0.0423)	(0.0406)	(0.0406)	(0.0404)	(0.0405)
Residents per room	0.0584	0.0467	0.0808**	0.0801**	0.0801**	0.0791**	0.0781**
	(0.0394)	(0.0393)	(0.0387)	(0.0372)	(0.0371)	(0.0370)	(0.0371)
Wood window frames	-0.0157	0.0286	0.0289	0.0391	0.0383	0.0421	0.0364
	(0.0527)	(0.0519)	(0.0518)	(0.0494)	(0.0493)	(0.0491)	(0.0492)
State-managed building	0.251**	0.149	0.230**	0.214**	0.210**	0.189*	0.197*
	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)
N	1113	1117	1205	1275	1275	1275	1275
r2	0.109	0.122	0.112	0.104	0.104	0.112	0.107

OLS regressions. Building group fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should provide support housing for everyone who needs it>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. Model 1: *Variable* is the average answer to the following 8 questions: <Do you trust [President of Russia, Government of Russia, State Duma, Mayor of Moscow, Moscow State Duma, *Uprava* (or district administration), district council, United Russia party] in representing your rights and interests?> The answers are 3 - <Completely trust>, 2 - <Somewhat trust>, 1 - <Somewhat distrust>, 0 - <Do not trust at all>. We use answers from only those institutions that were mentioned as potential authors of the renovation program in a seperate question asking respondents to name up to three of institutions they felt were authors of the program (from a list of these eight). Model 2: *Variable* is the average of the answers to the following three questions: <Do you agree that [the size of pensions/ housing benefits/ access to medical services] are provided according to transparent criteria? The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 3: *Variable* is the individual's answer to the question: <Do you agree that civil servants can be trusted to follow the law?>. The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 4: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of larger size than the one they currently own>. Model 5: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of greater market value than the one they currently own>. Model 6: *Variable* is whether the individual has marked any of the institutions mentioned in Model 1 when asked which government institutions follow primarily public interest with respect to the renovation program. Model 7: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <The renovation program will enrich city officians and the construction industry>.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: The effects of program participation and various potential mechanisms on support for housing programs

	Trust in Authors	Policy Discretion	Rule of Law	More Space	More Value	Incumbents Defend	Corrupt Intent
May 2017 list	0.0977*	0.130***	0.117**	0.119**	0.118**	0.105**	0.0940**
	(0.0499)	(0.0493)	(0.0484)	(0.0473)	(0.0476)	(0.0477)	(0.0476)
Variable	0.0743**	0.111***	0.109***	-0.105**	-0.0553	0.0681	-0.152***
	(0.0299)	(0.0331)	(0.0276)	(0.0513)	(0.0595)	(0.0516)	(0.0522)
Male	0.0143	-0.0207	0.00495	-0.00162	0.000314	-0.00104	0.00518
	(0.0525)	(0.0523)	(0.0510)	(0.0501)	(0.0501)	(0.0501)	(0.0500)
Age	-0.000560	-0.000621	0.000557	-0.000318	-0.000380	-0.000340	-0.000288
	(0.00248)	(0.00247)	(0.00237)	(0.00232)	(0.00233)	(0.00233)	(0.00232)
Higher education	-0.138***	-0.112**	-0.119**	-0.122**	-0.120**	-0.121**	-0.104**
	(0.0524)	(0.0520)	(0.0507)	(0.0498)	(0.0499)	(0.0499)	(0.0501)
Income	-0.177	-0.280*	-0.264	-0.254	-0.263*	-0.276*	-0.287*
	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.157)
Unemployed	0.356*	0.295	0.330*	0.341*	0.339*	0.337*	0.316*
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.191)
Retiree	-0.0161	-0.0588	-0.0385	-0.0321	-0.0370	-0.0463	-0.0504
	(0.0956)	(0.0962)	(0.0929)	(0.0907)	(0.0908)	(0.0909)	(0.0906)
State employee	0.0743	0.0570	0.0529	0.0518	0.0497	0.0459	0.0419
	(0.0633)	(0.0622)	(0.0614)	(0.0604)	(0.0605)	(0.0605)	(0.0604)
Privatized apartment	-0.0121	-0.0199	0.000647	0.00117	-0.00424	-0.00217	-0.00138
	(0.0549)	(0.0539)	(0.0530)	(0.0518)	(0.0519)	(0.0518)	(0.0517)
Number of rooms	-0.0864*	-0.0390	-0.0217	-0.0439	-0.0458	-0.0461	-0.0413
	(0.0478)	(0.0480)	(0.0469)	(0.0457)	(0.0457)	(0.0457)	(0.0456)
Residents per room	-0.0604	-0.0487	-0.0257	-0.0349	-0.0378	-0.0388	-0.0391
	(0.0436)	(0.0438)	(0.0425)	(0.0415)	(0.0415)	(0.0415)	(0.0414)
Wood window frames	0.0609	0.0951	0.0611	0.0763	0.0700	0.0714	0.0686
	(0.0584)	(0.0578)	(0.0568)	(0.0551)	(0.0551)	(0.0551)	(0.0549)
State-managed building	0.164	0.162	0.191	0.209*	0.191*	0.182	0.172
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
N	1113	1115	1200	1268	1268	1268	1268
r2	0.148	0.142	0.130	0.123	0.120	0.121	0.126

OLS regressions. Building group fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should provide support for the unemployed>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. Model 1: *Variable* is the average answer to the following 8 questions: <Do you trust [President of Russia, Government of Russia, State Duma, Mayor of Moscow, Moscow State Duma, *Uprava* (or district administration), district council, United Russia party] in representing your rights and interests?> The answers are 3 - <Completely trust>, 2 - <Somewhat trust>, 1 - <Somewhat distrust>, 0 - <Do not trust at all>. We use answers from only those institutions that were mentioned as potential authors of the renovation program in a seperate question asking respondents to name up to three of institutions they felt were authors of the program (from a list of these eight). Model 2: *Variable* is the average of the answers to the following three questions: <Do you agree that [the size of pensions/ housing benefits/ access to medical services] are provided according to transparent criteria? The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 3: *Variable* is the individual's answer to the question: <Do you agree that civil servants can be trusted to follow the law?>. The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 4: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of larger size than the one they currently own>. Model 5: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of greater market value than the one they currently own>. Model 6: *Variable* is whether the individual has marked any of the institutions mentioned in Model 1 when asked which government institutions follow primarily public interest with respect to the renovation program. Model 7: *Variable* is whether the individual agrees that <The renovation program will enrich city officians and the construction industry>.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: The effects of program participation and various potential mechanisms on support for unemployment programs

	Trust in Authors	Policy Discretion	Rule of Law	More Space	More Value	Incumbents Defend	Corrupt Intent
May 2017 list	0.0605	0.0462	-0.0620	0.0553*	0.106***	0.142***	-0.128***
	(0.0510)	(0.0454)	(0.0513)	(0.0290)	(0.0231)	(0.0300)	(0.0276)
Male	0.0165	0.184***	0.0204	-0.0341	-0.0343	0.0474	0.0211
	(0.0537)	(0.0479)	(0.0539)	(0.0308)	(0.0246)	(0.0316)	(0.0291)
Age	0.00235	0.00201	-0.00328	0.000604	-0.000241	-0.00116	0.000392
	(0.00253)	(0.00227)	(0.00250)	(0.00146)	(0.00115)	(0.00145)	(0.00134)
Higher education	-0.163***	-0.00971	-0.0145	-0.0238	0.0151	-0.00490	0.116***
	(0.0537)	(0.0480)	(0.0540)	(0.0308)	(0.0243)	(0.0317)	(0.0292)
Income	0.172	0.332**	0.599***	0.200**	0.171**	0.120	-0.105
	(0.174)	(0.153)	(0.167)	(0.0972)	(0.0769)	(0.0963)	(0.0882)
Unemployed	-0.0334	-0.0669	0.241	0.102	0.142	-0.113	-0.132
	(0.202)	(0.185)	(0.205)	(0.123)	(0.0904)	(0.119)	(0.115)
Retiree	0.102	0.0906	0.269***	0.0925*	0.0314	0.153***	-0.0906*
	(0.0972)	(0.0882)	(0.0972)	(0.0557)	(0.0449)	(0.0570)	(0.0525)
State employee	-0.0175	0.0425	0.0665	0.0254	0.0257	0.0317	-0.0459
	(0.0653)	(0.0576)	(0.0654)	(0.0376)	(0.0291)	(0.0383)	(0.0354)
Privatized apartment	0.0280	0.0261	-0.0608	0.0519	-0.0147	-0.0302	0.0141
	(0.0562)	(0.0498)	(0.0562)	(0.0318)	(0.0251)	(0.0330)	(0.0303)
Number of rooms	0.0262	-0.0186	-0.000496	0.0140	-0.0103	0.0172	0.0204
	(0.0482)	(0.0438)	(0.0490)	(0.0278)	(0.0217)	(0.0287)	(0.0270)
Residents per room	-0.000516	-0.00425	0.00468	0.0403	0.0135	-0.00205	-0.0115
	(0.0445)	(0.0402)	(0.0448)	(0.0258)	(0.0201)	(0.0260)	(0.0246)
Wood window frames	-0.00988	0.0381	0.154**	0.0716**	0.0211	-0.0373	-0.00405
	(0.0597)	(0.0534)	(0.0599)	(0.0337)	(0.0264)	(0.0349)	(0.0321)
State-managed building	0.389***	0.330***	0.293**	0.202***	0.0612	0.113	-0.113
	(0.124)	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.0711)	(0.0570)	(0.0694)	(0.0690)
N	1140	1141	1235	1299	1286	1298	1314
r2	0.181	0.213	0.125				

Models 1-4 are OLS, 5-8 are marginal effects for logit. Building group fixed effects. Model 1: DV is the average answer to the following 8 questions: <Do you trust [President of Russia, Government of Russia, State Duma, Mayor of Moscow, Moscow State Duma, *Uprava* (or district administration), district council, United Russia party] in representing your rights and interests?> The answers are 3 - <Completely trust>, 2 - <Somewhat trust>, 1 - <Somewhat distrust>, 0 - <Do not trust at all>. We use answers from only those institutions that were mentioned as potential authors of the renovation program in a seperate question asking respondents to name up to three of institutions they felt were authors of the program (from a list of these eight). Model 2: DV is the average of the answers to the following three questions: <Do you agree that [the size of pensions/ housing benefits/ access to medical services] are provided according to transparent criteria? The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 3: DV is the individual's answer to the question: <Do you agree that civil servants can be trusted to follow the law?>. The possible answers are 3 - <Completely agree>, 2 - <Somewhat agree>, 1 - <Somewhat disagree>, 0 - <Completely disagree>. Model 4: DV is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of larger size than the one they currently own>. Model 5: DV is whether the individual agrees that <Most of program participants will get property of greater market value than the one they currently own>. Model 6: DV is whether the individual has marked any of the institutions mentioned in Model 1 when asked which government institutions follow primarily public interest with respect to the renovation program. Model 7: DV is whether the individual agrees that <The renovation program will enrich city officians and the construction industry>. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: The effects of program participation on potential channels linking redistributive preferences and program participation

		Trust in Aurhors	Policy Discretion	Rule of Law	More Space	More Value	Incumbents Defend	Corrupt Intent
Unemployed	ACME	0.0053	0.0056	-0.0064	-0.0058	-0.0056	0.0100	0.0149
		(-0.0008 0.0139)	(-0.0028 0.0157)	(-0.0167 0.0027)	(-0.0133 -0.0004)	(-0.0165 0.0042)	(-0.0012 0.0224)	(0.0056 0.0267)
	Direct	0.0973	0.1291	0.1169	0.1203	0.1204	0.1068	0.0935
		(0.0187 0.1755)	(0.0513 0.2064)	(0.0406 0.1928)	(0.0424 0.1981)	(0.0468 0.1997)	(0.0283 0.1853)	(0.0185 0.1682)
	Total	0.1026	0.1347	0.1104	0.1145	0.1148	0.1168	0.1085
		(0.0203 0.1803)	(0.0520 0.2115)	(0.0287 0.1866)	(0.0363 0.1906)	(0.0396 0.1950)	(0.0389 0.1914)	(0.0295 0.1817)
Housing	ACME	0.0057	0.0036	-0.0032	-0.0015	-0.0065	0.0231	0.0110
		(-0.0009 0.0142)	(-0.0027 0.0114)	(-0.0095 0.0015)	(-0.0063 0.0022)	(-0.0165 0.0022)	(0.0112 0.0366)	(0.0026 0.0212)
	Direct	0.0775	0.0755	0.1068	0.1101	0.1196	0.0888	0.0937
		(0.0066 0.1481)	(0.0058 0.1449)	(0.0372 0.1761)	(0.0403 0.1799)	(0.0533 0.1909)	(0.0187 0.1590)	(0.0265 0.1607)
	Total	0.0832	0.0792	0.1036	0.1086	0.1131	0.1119	0.1047
		(0.0084 0.1533)	(0.0057 0.1480)	(0.0293 0.1728)	(0.0391 0.1769)	(0.0457 0.1854)	(0.0432 0.1791)	(0.0341 0.1707)
Rich/poor	ACME	0.0019	0.0036	-0.0007	0.0015	-0.0067	0.0117	0.0028
		(-0.0014 0.0070)	(-0.0011 0.0101)	(-0.0042 0.0023)	(-0.0027 0.0064)	(-0.0164 0.0019)	(0.0023 0.0227)	(-0.0034 0.0101)
	Direct	0.0670	0.0930	0.0816	0.0797	0.0929	0.0716	0.0758
		(0.0015 0.1322)	(0.0290 0.1566)	(0.0187 0.1442)	(0.0157 0.1437)	(0.0323 0.1582)	(0.0073 0.1360)	(0.0142 0.1371)
	Total	0.0689	0.0966	0.0809	0.0813	0.0862	0.0834	0.0786
		(0.0020 0.1335)	(0.0295 0.1598)	(0.0153 0.1434)	(0.0166 0.1439)	(0.0246 0.1526)	(0.0197 0.1449)	(0.0148 0.1390)

Table 10: Mediation analysis, 90% confidence intervals

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
May 2017 list	0.123***	-0.0199	0.00711	0.159***	0.139***	0.00348
	(0.0415)	(0.0227)	(0.0225)	(0.0506)	(0.0452)	(0.0232)
Male	-0.0222	-0.0473**	-0.0300	0.000425	-0.0617	-0.0299
	(0.0410)	(0.0225)	(0.0222)	(0.0500)	(0.0447)	(0.0230)
Age 18-15	0.0738	-0.140***	-0.0689	0.218**	0.0623	0.0279
	(0.0841)	(0.0466)	(0.0460)	(0.102)	(0.0918)	(0.0476)
Age 18-25 × May 2017 list	-0.343***	0.0995	-0.0279	-0.412***	-0.281**	-0.102
	(0.121)	(0.0671)	(0.0663)	(0.147)	(0.133)	(0.0685)
Higher education	-0.0852**	-0.0493**	-0.0331	-0.111**	-0.154***	-0.0136
	(0.0415)	(0.0228)	(0.0225)	(0.0503)	(0.0452)	(0.0232)
Income	-0.176	0.0637	0.0435	-0.278*	-0.212	0.0220
	(0.127)	(0.0692)	(0.0679)	(0.157)	(0.139)	(0.0702)
Unemployed	-0.104	0.169**	0.117	0.310	-0.0338	0.124
	(0.153)	(0.0858)	(0.0847)	(0.192)	(0.169)	(0.0875)
Retiree	0.0922	-0.00161	-0.000429	-0.0460	-0.0692	0.0163
	(0.0582)	(0.0317)	(0.0312)	(0.0713)	(0.0633)	(0.0323)
State employee	0.151***	0.0240	0.0595**	0.0462	0.0645	0.0412
	(0.0503)	(0.0274)	(0.0271)	(0.0605)	(0.0545)	(0.0280)
Privatized apartment	0.0499	0.0111	0.0426*	-0.00721	-0.00447	0.0307
	(0.0424)	(0.0233)	(0.0230)	(0.0516)	(0.0462)	(0.0237)
Number of rooms	-0.0630*	-0.0250	-0.0249	-0.0512	0.0454	-0.0146
	(0.0371)	(0.0203)	(0.0201)	(0.0457)	(0.0406)	(0.0208)
Residents per room	-0.0248	0.00451	-0.0192	-0.0380	0.0788**	0.000207
	(0.0342)	(0.0185)	(0.0183)	(0.0413)	(0.0370)	(0.0190)
Wood window frames	-0.00547	-0.0228	0.0157	0.0627	0.0337	-0.0189
	(0.0450)	(0.0247)	(0.0244)	(0.0549)	(0.0491)	(0.0252)
Brick building	0.119	-0.0975	-0.00582	-0.198	0.0816	0.182
	(0.313)	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.383)	(0.344)	(0.179)
State-managed building	0.136	0.0653	0.0137	0.176	0.201**	0.128**
	(0.0935)	(0.0512)	(0.0505)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.0521)
N	1254	1310	1310	1268	1275	1309
r2	0.0958	0.110	0.105	0.126	0.107	0.0919

OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies, impressionable age effect.

	Rich/poor	Health	Elderly	Unemployed	Housing	Education
voted_build	0.0991**	-0.00815	0.00537	0.140**	0.132***	-0.0130
	(0.0470)	(0.0258)	(0.0255)	(0.0569)	(0.0511)	(0.0263)
Male	-0.0219	-0.0482**	-0.0304	0.000954	-0.0619	-0.0292
	(0.0400)	(0.0219)	(0.0216)	(0.0488)	(0.0436)	(0.0224)
Age	0.00433**	0.00237**	0.00228**	-0.000344	-0.000185	-0.000325
	(0.00185)	(0.00102)	(0.00100)	(0.00227)	(0.00202)	(0.00104)
Higher education	-0.0828**	-0.0406*	-0.0268	-0.119**	-0.152***	-0.0129
	(0.0400)	(0.0220)	(0.0217)	(0.0487)	(0.0437)	(0.0224)
Income	-0.152	0.0633	0.0477	-0.269*	-0.214	0.0183
	(0.124)	(0.0676)	(0.0663)	(0.154)	(0.136)	(0.0686)
Unemployed	-0.103	0.164*	0.117	0.319*	-0.0310	0.132
	(0.149)	(0.0837)	(0.0825)	(0.187)	(0.165)	(0.0853)
Retiree	-0.00361	-0.0453	-0.0436	-0.0434	-0.0562	0.0285
	(0.0723)	(0.0395)	(0.0389)	(0.0886)	(0.0790)	(0.0402)
State employee	0.156***	0.0238	0.0609**	0.0516	0.0750	0.0445
	(0.0490)	(0.0267)	(0.0264)	(0.0590)	(0.0531)	(0.0273)
Privatized apartment	0.0472	0.00895	0.0410*	-0.000714	0.00341	0.0326
	(0.0415)	(0.0228)	(0.0225)	(0.0506)	(0.0453)	(0.0232)
Number of rooms	-0.0619*	-0.0248	-0.0239	-0.0493	0.0451	-0.0134
	(0.0361)	(0.0198)	(0.0195)	(0.0446)	(0.0396)	(0.0202)
Residents per room	-0.0208	0.0103	-0.0145	-0.0420	0.0754**	-0.000433
	(0.0334)	(0.0181)	(0.0179)	(0.0404)	(0.0362)	(0.0186)
Wood window frames	-0.00590	-0.0273	0.0128	0.0708	0.0391	-0.0176
	(0.0439)	(0.0242)	(0.0238)	(0.0538)	(0.0481)	(0.0246)
State-managed building	0.179*	0.0660	0.0215	0.213*	0.230**	0.127**
	(0.0915)	(0.0502)	(0.0494)	(0.111)	(0.0987)	(0.0510)
N	1254	1310	1310	1268	1275	1309
r2	0.0906	0.107	0.105	0.117	0.101	0.0893

Second stage of 2SLS regressions. For the first stage, we regress whether the individual voted on the building's inclusion in the May 2017 list. Building group fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual's agreement with the statement: <Please tell me, how much you agree that the government should [provide the sick with the necessary health care services/provide a decent standard of living for the elderly/provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/provide residence to everyone who needs it/provide quality education for everyone who needs it/reduce income differences between rich and poor]>. The response options are 1 - <Completely disagree>, 2 - <Somewhat disagree>, 3 - <Somewhat agree>, 4 - <Completely agree>. *Income* is an ordinal variable where 0 corresponds to the lowest income category (<We do not have enough money even to buy food>) and 1 to the highest (<We have no financial difficulties, and can afford real estate if necessary>). *Unemployed*, *Retiree*, and *State employee* are 1 if the respondent is a retiree or a state employee, respectively. *Privatized* is 1 if the respondent or one of his/her ancestors received the apartment in a privatization deal. *Rooms* is the number of rooms in the apartment. *Wood* is 1 if the respondent's apartment has window frames made of wood. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor).

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: The effect of redevelopment program on the preferences for redistributive policies, one-sided non-compliance

Appendix A Determinants of Building Inclusion in Various Lists

In this part, we look at what factors contributed to the inclusion of a building in the renovation program. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table A13 we show the average marginal effects for the inclusion of a building in the May 2017 list; our observations consisted of all 5-floor buildings constructed between 1955 and 1980. We find that buildings in administrative districts with a more educated population had a smaller probability of being included in the May 2017 list, with each additional percent of highly educated people in 2002 reducing the probability by 1.46%. If the building is located in an electoral district with a higher turnout and a more pro-opposition vote in 2013 mayoral elections, then the building was also less likely to have been included on the May 2017 list; finally, brick buildings, those that were constructed according to non-standard projects, and those in a better condition also faced smaller chances of having been included in the list.

In Columns 3 and 4 of the same table, we look at all buildings that were not included in the May 2017 list, and look at the factors that contributed to their inclusion in the list published in August 2018. These were the buildings where the residents have held a homeowners meeting and decided to join the redevelopment program. Political preferences were again important — buildings in electoral districts with more pro-opposition and less pro-government voting were less likely to have joined the program. The building type also mattered, with brick and non-standard buildings being less likely to join. Buildings with a larger share of car owners or a larger number of retirees were also less likely to have joined the program.

Appendix B Detailed Survey Sampling Procedure

The sample selection process for our survey was as follows. We first compiled the list of all five-story apartment buildings in Moscow built between 1955 and 1980, excluding buildings constructed to non-standard designs, and buildings that had less than 45 apartments. Such buildings were generally higher-quality — they were built of brick, and had somewhat larger apartments – making them harder to compare to buildings using standard designs. Excluding these ensured that the remaining buildings would have similar floor plans, overall size, and number of apartments in a standard block. We divided the remaining buildings into two lists based on whether they were constructed of prefabricated concrete panel or brick. This was done because wall material was a strong correlate of support for the redevelopment program, even for buildings of standardized series; brick buildings were perceived to be of a higher quality, and support for redevelopment and relocation in these buildings was lower.

We then split each of these lists into two. List A consisted of those buildings that were included in the May 2017 list and where the state-organized vote was held. List B consisted of those buildings where we knew the residents never had to vote to join the program. These were the buildings that did not appear on the May 2017, the August 2017 list, or its updated version published in August 2018.[14]

We then proceeded to identify all electoral districts that had buildings from both list A and list B (the procedure was repeated separately for concrete and brick buildings). We chose one building from each list such

[14]The latter two lists consisted only of the buildings where the residents voted to join the renovation program. There was no centralized register for buildings that were not on the May 2017 list and where the residents voted to opt out of the program.

	May 2017		May 2017		August 2018		August 2018	
Higher ed. share, raion	-1.463**	(0.683)			0.0943	(0.202)		
2013 mayoral, turnout	-2.936***	(0.858)	-3.186***	(0.923)	-0.143	(0.271)	-0.138	(0.325)
2013 mayoral, Sobianin's vote	-0.0119	(0.899)	1.354	(0.908)	0.486	(0.325)	0.657*	(0.347)
2013 mayoral, Navalny's vote	-2.688**	(1.097)	-0.878	(1.157)	-0.537*	(0.323)	-0.0902	(0.359)
Distance to closest metro station	0.0164	(0.0368)	0.0930	(0.0708)	0.0137	(0.0124)	0.0171	(0.0230)
Brick walls=1	-0.341***	(0.0420)	-0.294***	(0.0400)	-0.188***	(0.0328)	-0.246***	(0.0338)
Non-standard project=1	-0.194***	(0.0427)	-0.168***	(0.0352)	-0.0696***	(0.0186)	-0.0411***	(0.0133)
State-managed=1	0.0130	(0.0675)	0.0960	(0.123)	0.0185	(0.0201)	0.0164	(0.0175)
Overall condition	-0.109	(0.236)	-0.349*	(0.180)	0.0770	(0.0864)	0.0377	(0.0799)
Car owners	-0.542**	(0.239)	-0.300	(0.218)	-0.541***	(0.130)	-0.314***	(0.113)
Retirees	0.139	(0.270)	0.289	(0.265)	-0.545***	(0.131)	-0.418***	(0.114)
Children	-0.214	(0.310)	-0.416	(0.290)	-0.261	(0.177)	-0.218	(0.174)
Work in health care	-1.603*	(0.851)	-1.696**	(0.863)	-0.200	(0.353)	0.0905	(0.334)
Work in education	1.128	(0.883)	-0.654	(0.744)	0.0660	(0.475)	-0.0392	(0.491)
Work in culture	-0.728	(2.104)	0.00180	(2.101)	-1.686*	(0.940)	-1.959**	(0.943)
Work in utilities	-4.469	(3.252)	-0.176	(1.564)	0.660	(1.099)	0.174	(1.063)
Work in transport	2.905*	(1.523)	0.245	(1.343)	3.038***	(0.838)	2.825***	(0.696)
Privatized land=1	-0.00864	(0.0641)	0.0559	(0.0569)	-0.0448**	(0.0188)	-0.0218	(0.0261)
Unmarked land=1	0.147***	(0.0293)	0.130***	(0.0364)	0.0327*	(0.0195)	0.0495***	(0.0164)
District FE	NO		YES		NO		YES	
N	6430		5356		3003		2836	
Pseudo R2	.2648		.3714		.1871		.2702	

The table reports average marginal effects from logistic regressions, evaluated at means of other variables. The first two models are for the inclusion of buildings in the May 2017 list. The third and fourth are for the inclusion of buildings in the August 2018 list, conditional on not being in May 2017 list. *Higher ed. share* is the fraction of people with higher education in a raion according to 2002 census. *2013 mayoral* electoral returns are fractions, given at UIk (electoral district) level. *Brick walls* and *Non-standard project* are 0 or 1. *State-managed* is 0 or 1, whether the building is maintained by the state-owned district *GBU zhilishnik*. *Overall condition* is between 0 (excellent) and 100 (very poor); the latter 4 variables are from reformazkh.ru. *Privatized* and *Unmarked* land are dummy variables. SE clustered at district level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Inclusion of buildings in May 2017 and August 2018 lists.

that the distance between the buildings was minimized. The two resulting buildings were the *primary buildings* those residents were to be surveyed. We discarded all electoral districts where the primary buildings were more than 500 meters apart. If there was more than one building in a list in that electoral district, we selected a *back-up building* from that list with the smallest combined distance to the two primary buildings. We then verified whether the buildings in question were still standing using Google and Yandex (Russia's local search engine) Map applications.

The number of people to be surveyed in each electoral district was computed as follows. First, we calculated the total number of apartments in list A and list B. The quota for each list was equal to the minimum of these two numbers times 3/20. So, for example, if the primary building in list A had 80 apartments, and the backup building had 60, and list B had a single building with 120 apartments, the total quota would be 18 interviews from buildings in list A, and 18 interviews from the building in list B. The pollsters were then instructed to start interviewing residents in the primary building, and proceed to the backup building if the total quota was

not met. The interviews themselves were conducted either in the entrance way of the buildings or in the public space nearby. Respondents were screened to determine if they were residents of the target building and the interview stopped if they were not.

Because there were not enough pairs on our list to reach our target sample size of 1400 respondents, we supplemented our lists with a set of physically proximate buildings from different electoral districts, but within the same administrative district.[15] The procedure for selecting the remaining buildings was as follows. First, we composed lists A and B for each administrative district, excluding any buildings that were selected as either primary or backup at the previous stage. We then selected the most proximate pair of buildings, and repeated the procedure until the pair of buildings selected at the next iteration was more than 500 meters apart. Such buildings will largely conform to our identification strategy, since physical proximity should still insure relative similarity between buildings along most unobservables. Nevertheless, these additional buildings obviously violate our identification assumption, since in these cases buildings might have been included/excluded based on the differences in electoral data in their district. In other words, for these buildings, the authorities had data fine grained enough to account for electoral considerations in their selection. In selecting these buildings, we attempt to account for this by dropping all pairs with sufficiently different electoral outcomes. We calculate these outcomes using the normalized first principal component of the outcome of the 2016 State Duma (parliamentary) elections.[16] We then dropped all pairs where the difference between the outcomes at their electoral districts differed by more than 0.25. We then sampled the resulting list in order (from closest to most distant) until we reached the target sample size. The interview and screening procedure for these buildings was similar to our original list. The full lists of buildings used in our study are given in Tables B2 and B3.

Finally, sample selection for the municipally representative sample of 600 Muscovites was done using a three-stage selection procedure. In the first stage quotas for respondents were assigned to each of Moscow's 10 (*okrug*s) in proportion to each district's share of the overall city population. Between one and five administrative districts (*raion*) were then selected from okrug, depending on the number of respondents assigned to it in the first stage for a total of 34 neighborhoods across the city. Between 12 and 20 respondents were interviewed in each administrative district, with the precise number determined by the number of districts selected within each okrug and the target number of respondents per okrug. In the second stage, respondents in each neighborhood were approached and asked a set of screening questions designed to determine if they live in the neighborhood and basic demographic features. Respondents who did not live in the given neighborhood were rejected. Finally, at the third stage, respondents were selected in order to fulfill quotas on basic demographic parameters - age, gender, and education level — in order to insure representativeness relative to the city population. The non-response rate for this portion of the sample was 51.7%.

[15]This issue arises due to expected non-response rates for this type of survey, which our survey provider determined based on previous experience. Generally, one can expect 3 respondents per 20-flat section, with each apartment building in Moscow having a different number of sections depending on its location and design. Our first list of buildings did not have enough sections in the included building, so it was necessary to find additional buildings in order to reach the desired survey size.

[16]The first principal component explained 48.6% of the variance, with the eigenvalue equal of 5.36; see Table **??** for factor loadings. Higher values of the index corresponded to higher vote share of pro-opposition/liberal parties, and a lower vote share of the pro-government United Russia and its close ally LDPR.

Before continuing, it is important to note that we needed to conduct and additional data collection of 100 respondents in March of 2019. This stems from a mistake in our original dataset, which listed a small number of buildings as not having been included in the program despite their inclusion in A later wave. As some of these buildings were included in our group of excluded buildings and surveyed, we needed to find replacements. We did so by repeating the original procedure in order to find new excluded buildings to match with the included ones from the effected pairs.

Component	Factor loading
Turnout	-0.0245
LDPR	-0.2427
United Russia	-0.3602
KPRF	0.1643
Yabloko	0.3839
Rodina	0.2213
Pensioners	0.0526
Parnas	0.3108
Rost	0.3377

We report the factor loadings for the first principal component of the precintc-level electoral results for 2016 Moscow municipal elections. The first component explains 48.6% of the variance, with the eigenvalue equal of 5.36

Table B1: PCA factor loadings for electoral results of 2016 State Duma elections.

Group	Raion	UIK	May 2017 list	Address	Model	N
1	Bogorodskoe	874	Yes	Millionnaya Ulitsa, 8 b. 3	I-511	1
1	Bogorodskoe	874	Yes	Millionnaya Ulitsa, 10	I-410	7
1	Bogorodskoe	874	No	Pogonnyy Proyezd, 1 b. 10	I-511	9
2	Bogorodskoe	877	Yes	1-Ya Myasnikovskaya Ulitsa, 14	II-28	20
2	Bogorodskoe	877	Yes	1-Ya Myasnikovskaya Ulitsa, 14A	I-511	13
2	Bogorodskoe	877	No	Pogonnyy Proyezd, 6	I-511	4
2	Bogorodskoe	877	No	Pogonnyy Proyezd, 8	I-511	29
6	Izmaylovo	1031	Yes	Ulitsa Nikitinskaya, 1 b. 3	I-511	5
6	Izmaylovo	1031	Yes	Ulitsa Nikitinskaya, 1 b. 1	I-511	6
6	Izmaylovo	1031	No	Ulitsa Nikitinskaya, 1 b. 2	II-14	3
7	Novogireevo	1104	Yes	Novogireyevskaya Ulitsa, 49/28	NA	5
7	Novogireevo	1104	No	Martenovskaya Ulitsa, 20	II-28	4
7	Novogireevo	1104	No	Martenovskaya Ulitsa, 22 b. 1	I-511	5
8	Novogireevo	1097	Yes	2-Ya Vladimirskaya Ulitsa, 59/39	I-511	7
8	Novogireevo	1098	No	Perovskaya Ulitsa, 55	I-511	7
9	Perovo	1163	Yes	2-Ya Vladimirskaya Ulitsa, 34	I-511	7
9	Perovo	1163	No	1-Ya Vladimirskaya Ulitsa, 35 b. 1	II-14	7
11	Kuntsevo	2617	Yes	Yartsevskaya Ulitsa, 11 b. 3	I-511	12
11	Kuntsevo	2617	No	Bobruyskaya Ulitsa, 18 b. 2	I-511	12
12	Kuntsevo	2618	Yes	Bobruyskaya Ulitsa, 20	I-511	24
12	Kuntsevo	2618	No	Bobruyskaya Ulitsa, 24	I-511	24
14	Mozhaiskii	2661	No	Gvardeyskaya Ulitsa, 15 b. 1	I-511	9
15	Mozhaiskii	2662	Yes	Mozhayskoye Shosse, 20 b. 2	I-511	9
15	Mozhaiskii	2661	No	Gvardeyskaya Ulitsa, 13	I-511	4
16	Fili-Davydkovo	2899	Yes	Ulitsa Vatutina, 5 b. 2	I-511	9
16	Fili-Davydkovo	2899	No	Ulitsa Vatutina, 4 b. 1	I-511	10
19	Novomoskovskii AO	3359	Yes	Shcherbinka, Ulitsa Vysotnaya, 3	I-447	15
19	Novomoskovskii AO	3361	No	Shcherbinka, Yubileynaya Ulitsa, 12	I-447	15
22	Golovinskii	289	Yes	Leningradskoye Hwy, 74	I-511	12
22	Golovinskii	289	No	Konakovskiy Proyezd, 15	I-511	12
23	Koptevo	360	Yes	Proyezd Cherepanovykh, 58	I-410	14
23	Koptevo	360	No	Proyezd Cherepanovykh, 50	II-14	7
24	Koptevo	367	Yes	Ulitsa Generala Rychagova, 6	I-511	11
24	Koptevo	367	No	Ulitsa Generala Rychagova, 3 b. 1	II-14	11
25	Koptevo	370	Yes	Matrosa Zheleznyaka Bul'var, 18/12	I-511	21
25	Koptevo	370	No	Bol'shoy Koptevskiy Proyezd, 4	I-511	13
27	Alekseevskii	481	Yes	1-Y Rizhskiy Pereulok, 2 b. 4	I-511	8
27	Alekseevskii	481	No	Novoalekseyevskaya Ulitsa, 23	I-511	8
28	Alekseevskii	485	Yes	Ulitsa Konstantinova, 11	I-511	14
28	Alekseevskii	485	No	Ulitsa Pavla Korchagina, 9	II-14	14
37	Nagatinskii Zaton	1869	Yes	Sudostroitel'naya Ulitsa, 21/11	I-511	10
37	Nagatinskii Zaton	1869	Yes	Sudostroitel'naya Ulitsa, 25 b. 1	I-511	7
37	Nagatinskii Zaton	1880	No	Sudostroitel'naya Ulitsa, 30 b. 1	I-410	10
38	Nagornyi	1912	Yes	Varshavskoye Hwy, 92	I-511	9
38	Nagornyi	1912	No	Varshavskoye Hwy, 98	I-511	15
40	Lefortovo	1407	Yes	2-Ya Sinichkina Ulitsa, 7	I-511	5
40	Lefortovo	1407	Yes	Aviamotornaya St, 5	I-511	5
40	Lefortovo	1407	No	2-Ya Sinichkina Ulitsa, 1/2	I-511	10
41	Lublino	1409	Yes	Prospekt 40 Let Oktyabrya, 6	I-511	13
41	Lublino	1409	No	Kubanskaya Ulitsa, 14 2	I-511	12
42	Lublino	1436	Yes	Sovkhoznaya Ulitsa, 31	I-511	9
42	Lublino	1436	No	Novorossiyskaya Ulitsa, 19	I-515	9
43	Lublino	1437	Yes	Ulitsa Sudakova, 26	I-511	9
43	Lublino	1437	No	Ulitsa Sudakova, 25 b. 1	I-447	9
45	Ryazanskii	1574	Yes	Ulitsa Zarayskaya, 15	I-511	9
45	Ryazanskii	1574	No	Ulitsa Konovalova, 18	I-511	9
46	Ryazanskii	1577	Yes	Ryazanskiy Prospekt, 49 b. 3	I-511	15
46	Ryazanskii	1577	Yes	Ryazanskiy Prospekt, 49 b. 2	I-511	8
46	Ryazanskii	1577	No	Mikhaylova Ulitsa, 18 b. 1	I-511	8
46	Ryazanskii	1577	No	Mikhaylova Ulitsa, 14	I-511	15
47	Yuzhnotortovyi	1634	Yes	Ulitsa Mel'nikova, 15/10	I-511	7
47	Yuzhnotortovyi	1634	No	Sharikopodshipnikovskaya Ulitsa, 7 b. 2	II-14	7
48	Zuzino	2189	Yes	Sivashskaya Ulitsa, 13	I-511	7
48	Zuzino	2189	No	Ulitsa Azovskaya, 6 b. 1	II-14	7
51	Kotlovka	2254	Yes	Nagornaya Ulitsa, 15 b. 1,2	I-511	13
51	Kotlovka	2254	No	Nagornaya Ulitsa, 12 b. 3	I-511	13
52	Kotlovka	2261	Yes	Nagornyy Bul'var, 11	I-510	9
52	Kotlovka	2261	No	Nagornyy Bul'var, 9	II-14	9
53	Kotlovka	2257	Yes	Ulitsa Remizova, 10	I-511	9
53	Kotlovka	2255	No	Ulitsa Remizova, 3 b. 1	II-14	9

Table B2: List of brick buildings

Group	Raion	UIK		Address	Model	N
3	Bogorodskoe	879	Yes	Boytsovaya Ulitsa, 18 b. 2	I-510	9
3	Bogorodskoe	879	Yes	Bul'var Marshala Rokossovskogo, 20/18	I-510	12
3	Bogorodskoe	879	No	Bul'var Marshala Rokossovskogo, 28/14	I-510	10
3	Bogorodskoe	879	No	Ivanteyevskaya Ulitsa, 20	I-515	11
4	Vostochnoye Izmaylovo	924	Yes	15-Ya Parkovaya Ulitsa, 29 b. 1	KPD-4570	11
4	Vostochnoye Izmaylovo	921	No	16-Ya Parkovaya Ulitsa, 25 b. 1	I-515	10
5	Golianovo	981	Yes	Ulitsa Chusovskaya, 4 b. 2	I-515	15
5	Golianovo	981	No	Ulitsa Chusovskaya, 10 b. 2	I-515	15
10	Perovo	3389	Yes	Zelenyy Prospekt, 49	I-515	9
10	Perovo	1182	No	Ulitsa Metallurgov, 44 b. 2	I-515	9
13	Kuntsevo	2605	Yes	Yekateriny Budanovoy Ulitsa, 1/12	I-510	12
13	Kuntsevo	2614	No	Molodogvardeyskaya Ulitsa, 18 b. 2	I-515	12
14	Mozhaiskii	2663	Yes	Ulitsa Krasnykh Zor', 35	I-515	4
14	Mozhaiskii	2663	Yes	Ulitsa Krasnykh Zor', 29	I-515	6
17	Fili-Davydkovo	2900	Yes	Ulitsa Artamonova, 8 b. 2	KPD-4570	19
17	Fili-Davydkovo	2900	No	Amin'yevskoye Shosse, 32	I-515	19
18	Novomoskovskii AO	3360	Yes	Shcherbinka, Simferopol'skaya Ulitsa, 4B	NA	14
18	Novomoskovskii AO	3361	No	Shcherbinka, Yubileynaya Ulitsa, 10	I-447	14
20	Novomoskovskii AO	3356	Yes	Shcherbinka, Ulitsa 40 Let Oktyabrya, 1	I-464/467	5
20	Novomoskovskii AO	3356	No	Shcherbinka Ulitsa Lyublinskaya, 8	I-464/467	10
21	Novomoskovskii AO	3359	Yes	Shcherbinka, Ulitsa 40 Let Oktyabrya, 6/1	I-447	19
21	Novomoskovskii AO	3359	No	Shcherbinka, Ulitsa Vysotnaya, 6	NA	10
21	Novomoskovskii AO	3392	No	Shcherbinka, Ulitsa Vysotnaya, 9	I-464/467	5
26	Timiryazevskii	437	Yes	Dmitrovskoye Shosse, 15 b. 2	I-510	12
26	Timiryazevskii	437	No	Ulitsa Ivanovskaya, 22	I-510	12
29	Butyrskii	597	Yes	Ulitsa Yablochkova, 26 b. 2	I-510	9
30	Marjina Roscha	658	Yes	2-Ya Mar'inoy Roshchi Ulitsa, 14B	I-515	8
30	Marjina Roscha	658	Yes	2-Y Proyezd Mar'inoy Roshchi, 17	I-515	3
30	Marjina Roscha	658	No	2-Ya Mar'inoy Roshchi Ulitsa, 14A	I-515	15
31	Rostokino	749	Yes	Malakhitovaya Ulitsa, 9	I-511	19
31	Rostokino	749	No	Prospekt Mira, 192	I-510	11
31	Rostokino	749	No	Rostokinskaya Ulitsa, 1	I-510	10
32	Pokrovskoe-Streshnevo	2964	Yes	Polesskiy Proyezd, 6 b. 2	I-510	13
32	Pokrovskoe-Streshnevo	2964	No	Polesskiy Proyezd, 6 b. 1	I-510	12
33	Troitskii AO	3380	Yes	Shishkin Les, 19	NA	18
33	Troitskii AO	3381	No	Shishkin Les, 21	NA	18
34	Presnenskii	99	Yes	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 19a	I-510	18
34	Presnenskii	99	No	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 25	I-510	9
35	Presnenskii	100	Yes	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 9a	I-510	4
35	Presnenskii	100	Yes	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 7A	I-510	5
35	Presnenskii	100	No	Strel'bishchenskiy Pereulok, 7	I-510	9
36	Donskoi	1783	Yes	Sevastopol Avenue, 7 b.5	I-510	10
36	Donskoi	1783	No	Sevastopol Avenue, 3 b. 2	I-511	10
39	Kuzminki	1353	Yes	Ulitsa Fedora Poletayeva, 8 b. 1	I-515	11
39	Kuzminki	1353	No	Ulitsa Fedora Poletayeva, 12	KPD-4570	11
44	Lublino	1421	Yes	Taganrogskaya Ulitsa, 11 b. 3	I-511	9
44	Lublino	1436	No	Novorossiyskaya Ulitsa, 17	I-515	9
49	Zuzino	2194	Yes	Ulitsa Kakhovka, 15 b. 1	I-510	11
49	Zuzino	2194	Yes	Ulitsa Kakhovka, 15 b. 2	I-510	7
49	Zuzino	2194	No	Kerchenskaya Ulitsa, 3	I-515	18
50	Konkovo	2227	Yes	Profsoyuznaya Ulitsa, 93 b. 1	I-515	16
50	Konkovo	2242	No	Profsoyuznaya Ulitsa, 110 b. 3	I-515	27

Table B3: List of concrete buildings